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Abstract 
Economic research on structural change in agriculture has repeatedly induced controversies about 
basic theoretical concepts, such as rational behaviour and equilibrium, and their analytical and 
political implications. To contribute to the epistemological dimension of this debate, the article gives 
an overview of three paradigms to economic modelling whose proponents have been inspired by 
physics, biology, and chemistry. The key concepts of general equilibrium theory, evolutionary eco-
nomics and the “social chemistry” of Jon Elster are presented and compared. While all keep the idea 
that intentional individual action can explain aggregate outcomes that are nevertheless unintended, 
they differ in assumptions concerning preferences and the characteristics of coordination mechanisms. 
There is no consensus on what counts as a good scientific explanation. Similarly, views differ to what 
extent a spontaneous order in the economy has desirable properties. The emerging theoretical 
heterogeneity, I conclude, provides new opportunities for understanding agrarian change in contempo-
rary society, of which a few are outlined. 
Keywords:  economic modelling, natural sciences, agricultural change, philosophy of science. 
Zusammenfassung 
Die ökonomische Forschung zum Strukturwandel in der Landwirtschaft hat immer wieder Kontro-
versen über die Verwendung grundsätzlicher theoretischer Konzepte, wie etwa Rationalverhalten oder 
Gleichgewicht, und ihre politischen Implikationen ausgelöst. Dieser Artikel möchte einen wissen-
schaftstheoretischen Beitrag zu dieser Debatte leisten, indem er einen Überblick über drei Paradigmen 
                                                          
∗  Comments by Wilhelm Brandes and by workshop participants in Liebenberg are gratefully acknowledged. 
The usual disclaimer applies. 
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der ökonomischen Modellierung gibt, deren Vertreter von den naturwissenschaftlichen Disziplinen 
Physik, Biologie und Chemie beeinflusst wurden. Es werden die Schlüsselkonzepte von allgemeiner 
Gleichgewichtstheorie, evolutorischer Ökonomik sowie der „social chemistry“ Jon Elster’s vorgestellt 
und verglichen. Während alle drei Ansätze auf der Idee beruhen, dass absichtsvolles, individuelles 
Handeln aggregierte Ergebnisse erklären kann, die jedoch von den Einzelnen unbeabsichtigt eintreten, 
unterscheiden sie sich in ihren Annahmen über Präferenzen und den Eigenschaften von Koordinations-
mechanismen. Es besteht keine Übereinstimmung in der Frage, was als gute wissenschaftliche 
Erklärung gelten kann. Ebenso unterscheidet sich die jeweilige Einschätzung, inwieweit die spontane 
Ordnung eines Wirtschaftssystems wünschenswerte Eigenschaften hat. Die sich entwickelnde 
theoretische Vielfalt, so meine Schlussfolgerung, bietet neue Möglichkeiten für das Verständnis von 
agrarstrukturellem Wandel in der Gegenwart, von denen einige skizziert werden. 
Schlüsselwörter: Ökonomische Modellbildung, Naturwissenschaften, Strukturwandel im Agrarsektor, 
Wissenschaftstheorie. 
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1. Introduction 
Some thirty years ago, a group of agricultural economists originating from various Western 
countries founded what they called the “Trans-Atlantic Committee on Agricultural Change” 
(TACAC). A major driving force in the formation of this group was a prevalent 
dissatisfaction with the theories and models available at the time to study structural change in 
agriculture. Heidhues (1976, 152-3), in an introductory article to a symposium issue of the 
European Review of Agricultural Economics that presented the main results of TACAC, 
commented on the standard modelling approach of that time as follows: “An accepted way to 
analyze change is to set up an economic model, determine the equilibrium of the system, and 
investigate its properties. … However, as a certain level of familiarity and proficiency in 
economic analysis is reached, both in government and in general, not only the benefits, but 
also the limitations of thinking predominantly in terms of equilibria become apparent. These 
limitations are not new but they need to be stated nevertheless.” He moved on to address the 
major shortcomings of this approach. According to Heidhues, in studies of agricultural 
change, the existence and stability of equilibria is often not of focal interest. Furthermore, he 
claimed that the partial approach of the dominating paradigm neglects the embeddedness of 
agrarian change in a larger social system and thus fails to provide an adequate understanding 
of the causes, directions, and rates of change. This diagnosis led him to a plea for an explicit 
disequilibrium approach to agricultural change, which should address such issues as the 
objectives and behaviour of individuals and the processes of goal formation as well as the 
study of the information and coordination systems available for individual and group decision 
making (Heidhues 1976, 153-8). 
Fifteen years later, Schmitt (1992) rephrased the issue in the following question: Do 
agricultural economists have a theory of structural change in agriculture at their disposal? His 
trajectory, however, was different from that of Heidhues: Based on a neoclassical household 
labour allocation model, Schmitt’s article employed strong notions of rationality and 
equilibrium to analyse the efficiency of part-time farming.1  
While I do not want to take issue with specific claims of both authors here, it seems clear that 
their articles touched on a number of fundamental problems that any (economic) theory of 
agricultural change has to tackle: Which assumptions are appropriate to model the behaviour 
of decision makers? What are the major drivers of change or the reasons for inertia? How can 
we explain the substantial organisational heterogeneity in agricultural production? Is there a 
                                                          
1  Schmitt’s article is primarily a polemic against alternative views on structural change expressed by some of 
his professional colleagues, who are accused of using a theory of structural change that is inconsistent or of 
using no theory at all. His main hypothesis is that farmers, in times of rising off-farm wages, make a choice 
between on-farm and off-farm employment, so that the observed importance of part-time farming in many 
European countries can be interpreted as a rational response to changing constraints that leads to an efficient 
equilibrium of the farm household. The neoclassical theory of the firm as employed by other authors is 
accused of being unable to account for the empirical diversity of growing, shrinking, and stagnating farms. A 
central argument Schmitt puts forward in favour of a “rational part-time farmer” is that the actual opportunity 
costs of off-farm employment for farmers are allegedly overstated by most authors. See also Schmitt (1991). 
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role for politics? Even more fundamental questions could be as follows: Are concepts such as 
“rationality” or “equilibrium” useful for understanding agrarian change? What is the relation 
between theory and reality in the social sciences? 
That these question are still unresolved is reflected in the recent establishment of a Research 
Unit (Forschergruppe) on “Structural Change in Agriculture” funded by Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), which aims at the further theoretical and methodological 
understanding of agricultural change under conditions of contemporary society.2 It unites 
researchers that represent theories and methods which traditionally have been important in 
agricultural economics, such as neoclassical investment as well as partial and general 
equilibrium models, institutional economics, econometrics, but also (for agricultural 
economics) more recent approaches such as experimental economics and multi-agent 
modelling. I take the kick-off of this group as an occasion to review some of the fundamental 
strands of thinking about modelling the economy in general and agricultural change in 
particular.  
As a starting point for this comparative overview I have chosen the analogy between 
economics and the natural science disciplines of physics, biology, and chemistry. While this 
structuring is to some extent arbitrary, there can be no doubt that social scientists have always 
been inspired by the theories, methods, and perhaps successes of their colleagues from the 
natural sciences. My major aim is to demonstrate that recent years have seen a revived debate 
on these analogies, which may also provide new insights for the domain of agricultural 
economics. I attempt to make this analogy fruitful for shedding new light on the fundamental 
problems outlined above. 
2. The natural sciences in the eyes of economists 
In a first step, I present an overview of the fundamental approaches to science that are 
represented by the disciplines of physics, biology and chemistry. Of course, this overview is 
in no way able to do justice to the respective domains of these disciplines. It is highly 
selective and primarily represents the idealised ways in which social scientists have been 
inspired by the three natural sciences mentioned. Table 1 summarises the main ideas. 
                                                          
2  DFG Forschergruppe 986 „Strukturwandel im Agrarsektor – eine unternehmens- und politikbezogene Analyse“ 
(SiAg). The programme includes nine coordinated research projects located in Berlin, Braunschweig and 
Halle. See http://www.agrar.hu-berlin.de/struktur/institute/wisola/fowisola/siag for further details. 
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Table 1. Natural science inspirations in economics 
 Physics Biology Chemistry 
Characteristic 
approach to science 
Universal order and 
harmony guided by 
fundamental, invisible 
laws of movement; 
axiomatic parsimony 
Organic approach guided 
by self-organisation, path-
dependencies, mutation by 
chance, survival of the 
fittest 
No simple predictive 
principles, strong reliance 
on empirically observable 
causal patterns that trigger 
potentially indeterminate 
consequences 
Founding reference Isaac Newton’s mechanics 
(Principia Mathematica, 
1687) 
Charles Darwin’s 
evolutionary theory (On 
the Origin of Species, 
1859) 
Robert Boyle’s analytical 
chemistry (The Sceptical 
Chymist, 1661) 
Conceptual 
counterpart in 
economics 
Neoclassical economics, 
general equilibrium theory 
Evolutionary economics Social chemistry 
Selected 
representatives in 
economics 
Walras (1874), Arrow and 
Debreu (1954) 
“Conservatives”:  
Alchian (1950), Becker 
(1962); 
“Revisionsists”: 
Hirshleifer (1977), Bowles 
(2004); 
“Revolutionaries”:  
Veblen (1898), Nelson and 
Winter (1982), Bromley 
(2006) 
Elster (1989; 2007) 
Source: author. 
2.1 Physics 
There is a wide agreement that the development of economics as a scientific discipline was 
highly influenced by the then prevailing research programme of the natural sciences, notably 
Newtonian physics. The characteristic approach of physics that made it so attractive in the 
eyes of social scientists is neatly summarised by Redman (1997, 111, quoted in Cardoso 
2004, 20): 
“After Newton had founded order and harmony in the physical universe by 
discovering the laws that govern its movements, philosophers reasoned that disorder 
must be man-made and could be averted by studying human nature and ascertaining 
the natural laws or connecting principles that govern society. The existence of 
guiding social principles was taken for granted; the search for them then became the 
primary goal. The scholars of this age were convinced that immutable laws such as 
those reigning in the physical universe existed in society and in mental states of 
human beings.” 
It can be shown that these ideas were of direct importance for several of the economists that 
shaped the fundamental concepts of the discipline. Albert (1979, 52) argues that the 
4 Martin Petrick 
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foundation of economics in Adam Smith’s “Wealth of Nations” (1776) can be interpreted as 
the analysis of social order by using the methods of the natural sciences.3 Another important 
figure is Léon Walras, whose influence on modern textbook economics and notably partial 
and general equilibrium modelling is evident. Bowles (2004, 478) goes so far to denote the 
standard curriculum taught to undergraduate students of economics today as the “Walrasian 
paradigm”. It is the neoclassical general equilibrium model of the economy with its normative 
counterpart, welfare economics. I will describe this paradigm later on in a little more detail. 
Here it suffices to note with Blaug (1997, 550) that “the true origins of Walras’s formulation 
of general equilibrium theory was Louis Poinsot’s once famous textbook in pure mechanics, 
Eléments de Statique (1803), a book which Walras kept by his bedside throughout his life. No 
wonder then that Walras’s Elements [of Pure Economics (1874)] bristles with complimentary 
passages about Newton, drawing analogies between Newtonian physics and the ‘new’ 
economics typified by his own work.” Walras’s central idea of the existence of a multiple 
market-clearing general equilibrium was later generalised and formally refined by Arrow and 
Debreu (1954). 
2.2 Biology 
Despite the lasting influence of Newtonian physics, economists were not unaffected by other 
approaches to science. Probably the most important, second to physics, is the influence of 
biology, and notably evolutionary theory. From today’s perspective, an early reference to the 
analogy between economic and evolutionary processes is Veblen (1898). Schumpeter (1954, 
788) notes that the idea of society as an ‘organic’, not a ‘mechanical’ system played an 
important role already for 19th century economists. More recently, Nelson and Winter (1982, 
10) characterised the evolutionary approach as follows: 
“The broader connotations of ‘evolutionary’ include a concern with processes of 
long-term and progressive change. The regularities observable in present reality are 
interpreted not as a solution to a static problem, but as the result that 
understandable dynamic processes have produced from known or plausibly 
conjectured conditions in the past – and also as features of the stage from which a 
quite different future will emerge by those same dynamic processes. In this sense, all 
of the natural sciences are today evolutionary in fundamental respects. … Science 
has come to see the continents as shifting with sporadic violence beneath our feet, 
the changing behavior of the Sun as a possible factor in human history, and the 
world’s climate as threatened with major and perhaps irreversible change as a 
consequence of industrialization. Against this intellectual background, much of 
contemporary economic theory appears faintly anachronistic, its harmonious 
equilibria a reminder of an age that was at least more optimistic, if not actually more 
tranquil. It is as if economics has never really transcended the experiences of its 
                                                          
3  Cardoso (2004, 16) demonstrates how Smith was directly influenced by Newton. 
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childhood, when Newtonian physics was the only science worth imitating and 
celestial mechanisms its most notable achievement.” 
However, the continuing influence of evolutionary theory on economics, in particular the 
ideas of natural selection, self-organisation, and the role of chance in dynamic processes, was 
not uniform, but led to various strands of thought within what could be labelled the field of 
evolutionary economics. Vromen (2004) usefully distinguishes three major groups of 
“evolutionary” economists: the conservatives, the revisionists, and the revolutionaries.  
– For the conservatives, such as Alchian (1950) or Becker (1962), evolutionary ideas are 
used to “rescue” standard economic theories (Vromen 2004, 104). Whereas the details of 
the evolutionary processes at work remain vague, the basic idea is that profit maximising 
behaviour is induced by competitive markets in a process similar to natural selection, 
which thus provides an instrumental reason for keeping the orthodox model.  
– The revisionists aim at a “friendly amendment” of conventional theory (Vromen 2004, 
110). In particular, they introduce more complex (e.g. altruistic) preference structures of 
individuals and argue that these are the product of evolutionary processes of the past 
(Hirshleifer 1977). As such, evolutionary theories are used to provide a better 
understanding of observed behaviour, not (as in the conservative group) to justify certain 
a-priori assumptions in the orthodox neoclassical model. A recent textbook treatment of 
the revisionist camp is Bowles (2004), whose approach will be outlined below.  
– The revolutionaries consist of a number of more or less heterodox subgroups of 
economists who argue that the neoclassical standard model should be completely 
discarded. One of these subgroups is American institutionalism, of which Veblen (1898) 
is a classical and Bromley (2006) a recent representative. Nelson and Winter (1982) have 
been influential with a Neo-Schumpeterian, organisation-based analysis of growth and 
competition.4 
2.3 Chemistry 
To my knowledge, Jon Elster was the first to introduce the idea of a “social chemistry”, which 
he explains as follows (Elster1989, 1): “At the present time, the social sciences cannot aspire 
to be more than social chemistry: inductive generalizations that stick closely to the 
phenomena. The time for social physics is not yet here, and may never come.” In a footnote, 
he quotes Rigden (1987, 36-7) to make the difference clearer: “Physics is parsimonious. A 
few basic ideas have a validity that extends across nature from the smallness of the atom to 
                                                          
4  Views differ where the appropriate place for evolutionary game theory should be (Young 1998, Binmore 
2005). Sugden (2001) argues that this is nothing more than a “recovery programme” of formal behaviourism 
which recovers Nash equilibria as a result of boundedly rational choice and strong normative a-priori 
assumptions. However, as Vromen (2004, 117) points out, it might also be regarded as revolutionary because 
it substitutes the equilibrium selection concepts of classic game theory and its “refinement programme” 
(hyperrationality, common knowledge) by evolutionary arguments. It models the spontaneous emergence of 
stable, self-sustaining social patterns of behaviour, without design by an authority and without being the 
result of concerted action, thus formalising ideas of Austrian economists. 
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the vastness of the galaxy. Furthermore, these basic ideas capture a variety of factual 
information in the network of logical connections between them. The person who sees charm 
and beauty in the ideas of physics may see no enchantment whatsoever in chemistry. Lacking 
the simple predictive principles that are the stock in trade of physics, chemists are marvelous 
in their ability to hold in their heads at all times a vast array of information. Physicists, on the 
other hand, work from a base formed by a few remembered ideas.” Although not mentioned 
by Elster, the early chemist Robert Boyle may be an appropriate reference for this approach: 
Boyle’s work marks the transition from alchemy to chemistry. While he was highly insistent 
on the importance of empirical and experimental work to find out the principles of chemistry, 
he had few of them available at his time.  
Elsters research programme is influenced by two important themes, which makes his 
contribution particularly interesting in this survey. On the one hand, primarily his early works 
are motivated by a firm background conviction that humans have a type of rationality at their 
disposal that is superior to that of all other species (Elster 1979, 1-35; Petrick 2008). On the 
other hand, Elster is highly insistent that social science must be strongly empirically driven 
and must not reduce its efforts to find out the real processes that determine human behaviour. 
The first point leads Elster to reject the usefulness of the idea of natural selection to 
understand human societies.5 According to Elster (1979; 2007, 271-286), man has the distinct 
ability to find and approach global maxima. In contrast, all other living beings are only 
capable of reaching local maxima. For the second reason, Elster is highly critical with the type 
of functionalist explanations prevalent in mainstream economics, which he claims do only 
purport to be general laws but lack sufficient empirical foundation (Elster 1979, 28-34; 2007, 
9-31; see Pies 2008 for an overview). The biologists’ task is to discover the reasons for this 
difference. In contrast, the agenda of the social scientists is to find out why humans fail to 
reach global maxima, despite their extraordinary rationality potential. Therefore, Elster’s 
research programme can be regarded as a study of the nature of human’s imperfect rationality 
and its implications for the individual and its social environment (Petrick 2008). 
Because there are no lawlike generalisations in the social sciences, the researcher has to 
search for what Elster calls mechanisms, a form of generalisation intermediate between laws 
and description. Elster (1999, 1) defines mechanisms as “frequently occurring and easily 
recognisable causal patterns that are triggered under generally unknown conditions or with 
indeterminate consequences”. Mechanisms allow true explanation but no prediction, and 
enable the scientist to explain when generalisations break down (Elster 1999, 6). They are 
often described by proverbs, such as “out of sight, out of mind”, “like attracts like”, “like 
father, like son”. Elster reconstructs these patterns by using rational choice arguments in a 
non-formalised, qualitative way. 
                                                          
5  Elster (1979, 31) concedes that the behaviour of the profit maximising firm in a competitive market is one of 
few exemptions to the rule that natural selection can be used as a non functionalist explanation in the social 
sciences. 
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Figure 1. Reductionism in science according to Jon Elster 
 
Source: Elster (2007, 257). 
Furthermore, Elster is sceptical with establishing analogies between the natural and the social 
sciences (despite his plea for “social chemistry”). The theory of natural selection in biology is 
his prime example to demonstrate the dubious value of such analogies. Instead, he strongly 
advocates a reductionist connection between them (Figure 1). He believes that insights of the 
social sciences can be reduced to principles of psychology, which in turn builds on biology. 
The further steps of this ladder down to a more general science are chemistry and physics, 
which according to Elster is the most fundamental of all sciences (Elster 2007, 257-260). My 
reading of these statements is that Elster recommends to use the methods of the natural 
sciences (such as all types of induction based on empirical observations or experiments, 
including psychological ones, but also based on studying poetry or the arts in general), but 
warns to import their theories in an insufficiently reflected manner. 
3. A closer comparison of model ingredients 
In a further step, I now want to subject the specific concepts used in the three stylised strands 
of modelling to further scrutiny. Table 2 summarises the characteristics of each of the 
paradigms, which I now distinguish as “Walrasian economics”, “evolutionary economics”, 
and “social chemistry”. It allows to see commonalities as well as differences. 
Sociology, economics, political science, anthropology 
Psychology
Biology 
Chemistry
Physics 
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Table 2. Key concepts in economic paradigms influenced by physics, biology, and 
chemistry 
 Physics Biology Chemistry 
Paradigm Walrasian  
economics 
Evolutionary  
economics 
Social chemistry 
Behavioural principle Intentional individual action 
Generation of aggregate 
outcomes 
Generally unintended 
Drivers of results Constraint through competition Imperfect rationality 
Basic analytical model Solution of a constrained 
optimisation problem; 
comparative static 
comparison of unique, 
stable equilibria 
Adaptive agents carrying 
behavioural rules; 
explicit out-of-
equilibrium dynamics, 
role of chance 
Qualitative commonsense 
rationality interacting 
with empirically 
observed “mechanisms” 
Individual preferences Self-regarding, 
exogenous  
Self- and other-regarding, 
possibly endogenous 
Variety and plasticity of 
preferences & 
motivations as complex 
representations of human 
rationality 
Coordination 
mechanism 
Market-clearing prices, 
no institutions (other than 
the market) 
Genetic & cultural 
selection; coevolution of 
institutions, 
noncontractual relations 
in noncompetitive 
settings are common 
No natural selection,  
man = global maximiser; 
variety & 
interdependency of 
institutions  
Technology Convex  Increasing returns, 
positive feedbacks, 
learning  
No a-priori assumptions 
Open questions Illuminating about real (historical) processes? 
Desirability of outcomes? 
Source: author, inspired by Bowles (2004, 479). 
3.1 Common roots 
All three paradigms are united by a methodological individualism that seeks to explain human 
behaviour as a result of intentional individual action, which is directly related to their 
commitment to rational choice explanation. A further common idea is that aggregate out-
comes are generated and should be explained as unintended results of individual action. Both 
tenets have traditionally been fundamental to economics and could even be regarded as its 
constitutional elements (Stigler and Becker 1977; Satz and Ferejohn 1994; Elster 2007, 13, 
300). 
Competitive pressure on markets has always been a major object of study in economics, and it 
is here where many evolutionary economists see the analogy to natural selection processes. 
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This is thus the third of the “familiar triplet of ideas” that unite Walrasian and evolutionary 
economists (Bowles 2004, 8). Elster’s emphasis is more on studying the consequences of 
imperfect rationality in a variety of settings. Instead of focusing primarily on competitive 
environments, he is interested in opening the “black box” of individual (Elster 1999) and 
social (Elster 1989) decision making. 
3.2 Divergent research programmes 
For all of the four following characteristics one could say that they commonly imply strong 
theoretical assumptions in the Walrasian paradigm. The plausibility of the equally strong 
principles or laws within this paradigm (for example, the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare 
Economics or the Coase Theorem) rests on the validity of the assumptions. However, 
discontent with the validity and usefulness of these assumptions has been among the major 
driving forces behind the import of ideas from biology and chemistry. For this reason, the 
rigidity of concepts is more and more relaxed when one moves to the right of the table. 
The basic analytical model of the Walrasian paradigm is the constrained optimisation of 
utility or profit by participants of a perfect and complete market system. To achieve the 
desirable results of this coordination mechanism, namely the existence of a market-clearing 
price that produces a Pareto-optimal outcome, assumptions of exogenous preferences and 
convex technologies are commonly invoked. These are the preconditions that make the 
comparative static comparison of unique, stable equilibria a useful procedure. 
As noted above, almost all of the fundamental assumptions of this paradigm have been called 
into question by proponents of a more evolutionary, explicitly dynamic economics. The major 
point I wish to make here is that recent years have seen such an intensive development of this 
field that it has now left the stage of being merely one of many heterodox variants of 
economics. In my view, the publication of the textbook treatment by Bowles (2004) shows 
that there is now a closed, unified evolutionary approach to economics that claims to provide 
a more relevant and better empirically founded understanding of society than the orthodox 
Walrasian paradigm. While Vromen (2004) (in my view correctly) regards Bowles as a 
representative of the revisionist and not the revolutionary camp in evolutionary economics, 
the major departures from the traditional model are as follows: 
– Social interactions are commonly regarded as non-contractual rather than complete and 
readily enforced. 
– Individual behaviour are understood as being of an adaptive and other-regarding nature. 
– Generalised increasing returns, positive feedback effects and learning processes are the 
norm rather than the exception (Bowles 2004, 9-13).  
Along with relaxing the standard assumptions, new analytical techniques have been developed, 
among which experimental studies, game theory, bargaining models, heterogeneous-
populations and multi-agent models are prominent (see for example parts I and III of Bowles 
10 Martin Petrick 
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2004). These in turn allow the analysis of explicit out-of-equilibrium dynamics as well as 
complex institutional settings and their evolution. 
Although Elster as a major proponent of “social chemistry” is sceptical about the analogies 
employed by evolutionary economists, his own approach is nevertheless widely consistent 
with the evolutionaries, if not in modelling style, at least with respect to the major theoretical 
implications. In some respects, Elster goes even further than the “friendly revisionists” of 
evolutionary economics, in that his analysis of basic motivations for behaviour is of a much 
finer grain than common in the economics literature and can hardly be captured by a formal 
utility function. Introducing his most recent treatment of the subject, Elster (2007, 75) writes:  
“In the following, I focus on two specific issues, selfishness versus altruism and 
temporal shortsightedness versus farsightedness. These two issues complement each 
other, the latter being as it were the intertemporal version of the former, 
interpersonal contrast. … The set of human motivations is a pie that can be sliced 
any number of ways. Although none of them can claim canonical status, there are 
four approaches that I have found useful. The first proposes a continuum of 
motivations, the second and the third offer both a trichotomy, and the forth a simple 
dichotomy. The classifications are both somewhat similar and interestingly different, 
allowing us to illuminate the same behaviour from different angles.”6 
In a sense, however, Elster’s intellectual journey arrives at similar conclusions about the 
characteristics of human behaviour as that of many evolutionary economists, but from a 
different starting point. Evolutionaries have started with very simple (animal-like) behavioural 
assumptions and introduced more complex patterns such as other-regarding preferences by 
arguing that these were “added” in the course of human evolution (Binmore 2005). Elster 
begins with a praise of superior human rationality only to find out later that “real” everyday 
circumstances and mindsets often dilute these distinctive abilities. 
4. Which approach provides better explanations of real 
processes? 
Inspired by Bowles (2004, 87), two fundamental questions shall be picked out for further 
commentary. First, do the representatives of biological and chemical metaphors in economics 
live up to their promise to provide better explanations of reality, or of real historical 
processes? Second, if the alternative (or enriched and modified) theories are true, what do 
they have to say about the social desirability of the processes and outcomes they postulate? 
                                                          
6  Well in line with the labelling as “social chemistry” is the title of another book by Elster that examines the 
relationship between rationality and the emotions: “Alchemies of the mind” (1999). 
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Elster (2007, 21-28) sets out a very strict definition of what counts as a good explanation by 
enumerating what, in his view, is not an explanation:7  
1. A statement does not count as an explanation if it does not provide an actual causal 
mechanism,  
2. explanation is not simply correlation or coincidence,  
3. to say that there was a necessity for something to happen (for example the death of a 
person that is ill to death) is insufficient as an explanation if other causes are possible (the 
person could have been killed),  
4. explanation is not storytelling, or stating what might have caused something to happen, 
which includes a rejection of “as-if” explanations,  
5. to cite statistical significant findings as true explanations may be a fallacy if the general 
tendency in a dataset is not valid in each single case,  
6. to explain nonevents by nonevents is absurd (example: “the scientist did not cite my 
article in his book because he was not aware of it”), and  
7. prediction is not causal explanation, because the relevant causal mechanisms can often 
only be identified after an event had taken place, not before, in particularly in cases where 
several triggering mechanisms are possible.  
According to Elster, what does count as a true causal explanation is what he defines as a 
“mechanism”, as cited above. What he has in mind is a qualitative social science that 
“combine[s] utter authority in factual matters with an eye both for potential generalizations 
and for potential counterexamples to generalizations.” Such researchers “can pick out the 
‘telling detail’ as well as the ‘robust anomaly,’ thus providing both stimulus and reality check 
for would-be generalists” (Elster 2007, 447). Elster explicitly mentions historical analysis and 
case studies as being examplary for such an approach. His own studies have not been left 
uncriticised, however: Pies (2008) argues that an explanation by mechanisms results in a 
possibilistic approach to science, one that states how events might have been caused. This 
would imply that Elster himself commits the fallacy of storytelling, as (4) above. 
It is beyond the scope of this overview to conduct a comprehensive comparative analysis of 
the explanatory power of the three paradigms, which would require to look at specific subjects 
studied by the three. As a general comment, I have argued elsewhere that economists 
frequently purport to provide “hard” explanations, backed by statistical evidence, although 
they actually employ variants of storytelling (Petrick 2004). I have also suggested that this is 
simply a reflection of the fact that science is a communicative arena in which the most 
plausible arguments win – whereby the jury consists of the group of other scientists who 
criticise and probe the arguments put forward. The growing interest in evolutionary 
economics seems to indicate that more and more researchers do find this approach plausible – 
because it employs more valid assumptions, corresponds better with reality, uses more 
                                                          
7  See Elster (1979, 28) for a related list on what may count as a true functional explanation. 
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striking metaphors, or, after all, allows to tell more interesting stories. In a parallel to Elster, 
Bowles (2004, 88) sees a major function of evolutionary models in providing useful starting 
points for more detailed historical studies that may unveil the “true” processes. He illustrates 
this point in a discussion of an evolutionary game theory model of the spontaneous formation 
of property rights (Bowles 2004, 69-87). The question at hand is whether such institutions 
evolved spontaneously “by accident” or as a result of planned collective action. Bowles 
(2004, 88) writes:  
“Of course nobody supposes that a single model as simple as [this] … provides an 
adequate framework for understanding something as complex and historically 
contingent as the process by which property rights have been modified over the 
years. Models do not explain history, but they may tell us where to look. … 
Evolutionary modelling will have done the study of institutional change a great 
service if it can provide a framework for integrating the aggregate effects of large 
numbers of individuals each acting singly and seeking their own ends while 
occasionally acting jointly with others for whom institutional change is a project, not 
an accident.” 
Do economists have more to offer than “adequate frameworks” that “may tell us where to 
look”? What counts as a good explanation is, in relation to its importance for the progress of 
science, rarely discussed openly. My personal view is that the economic profession would 
gain significantly from a more honest debate of this matter, which includes the consideration 
of epistemology in the standard curriculum of the subject. 
5. “Blind watchmaker” vs. “global maximiser”:  
how desirable are the aggregate outcomes? 
The previous quote brings me to the second question, namely the social desirability of 
outcomes. Bowles (2004, 57-8) distinguishes two traditions of how the “right” institutions and 
policies are established: a constitutional and an evolutionary approach. The first, also called 
“institutions by design”-approach, posits that social rules and institutions are created in the 
human imagination, evaluated with respect to their problem-solving capacity and implemented 
if they are regarded as useful. This may involve the presence of actors who have benevolent 
preferences for social outcomes, as traditionally assumed in welfare economics. However, this 
need not be the case: Petrick and Pies (2007) present a contractarian approach to rule setting 
that does not require this assumption. The second, evolutionary approach implies that society 
organises itself by spontaneous order. Referring to a book title by Dawkins (1989), Bowles 
calls this the “blind watchmaker”-process. This may be phrased as a variant of the “invisible 
hand”-metaphor that is at the heart of the Walrasian paradigm: in the long run, the most 
efficient institutions will predominate, even if the outcomes they produce are unintended. 
However, evolutionary models as used by Bowles and others do not commonly reproduce this 
result. Bowles (2004, 90-1) lists a number of reasons why this is the case:  
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– Depending on institutional spill-over and complementarity effects, there may emerge 
multiple stable configurations of institutions, of which some may be very inefficient,  
– even if there are selection processes at work that produce more efficient institutions at the 
community level, the community may lack the mechanisms necessary to implement the 
better institutions,  
– similar to the emergence of new species, the creation of innovative designs in evolutionary 
models is highly improbable and still poorly understood,  
– evolutionary change is so slow that the effects of external shocks may by much more 
important for the result.  
According to Bowles, “survival of the fittest” is therefore unlikely to produce optimal results. 
This contrasts with the standard notion in Walrasian economics, where competitive market 
forces produce the results desired by consumers, but also with the arguments by the 
conservatives’ camp in evolutionary economics, which are based on a strict analogy between 
market competition and natural selection. 
In Elster’s view, humans as global maximisers rather than gradient climbers should be able to 
produce desirable results. However, the argument runs opposite to the conservatives’ natural 
selection argument: globally optimal results should be expected not because natural selection 
works so efficiently, but because humans are capable of overcoming the simple selection 
procedures used by evolution. By virtue of their intentionality, humans may use indirect 
strategies to achieve their goals, may recognise the value of waiting, and may aim ahead to 
reach a moving target (Elster 2007, 279). To the contrary, natural selection works opportunisti-
cally, myopically, individualistically, and cannot anticipate changes in the environment  
(p. 282). To a certain extent, however, Elster qualifies this statement himself by pointing out 
the various, empirically observable imperfections of human rationality (1989, 250): 
“Most writers try to make do with rational self-interest as a sole motivational 
assumption, while I have invoked a broader range of motives. Though I share their 
preference for a parsimonious explanation and their hesitation to get into a morass 
of ad hoc assumptions, I have concluded, with some reluctance, that there is no way 
in which the programme can be brought forward on this narrow basis. Ultimately, 
parsimony must take second place to realism. In physics, truth may be simple. In 
chemistry, it is likely to be messy.” 
In summary, the further we move away from assumptions that guarantee the functioning of a 
first-best world coordinated by the “invisible hand”, the less likely is it that outcomes exhibit 
any desirable properties. Compared to the harmonious world order of the Walrasian paradigm, 
a society understood in biological or chemical metaphors will leave much to be improved by 
purposeful collective action. 
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6. Implications for understanding agricultural change 
The traditional view of structural change in the farming sectors of Western societies is one of 
external technological progress in agriculture and, according to Engel’s law, a decreasing 
food share in consumers’ expenditures, which together lead to a fall in food prices and income 
decline in agriculture (Gardner 1992). As a result, farmers continuously have to adjust their 
production scale without being able to fully reap the benefits. For the same reason did most 
Western economies see a persistent reduction of the share of agriculture in gross domestic 
product (see Tracy 1993 for an overview and statistics). But this is not the complete picture. 
Under conditions of contemporary society, additional issues need to be explained, before 
agricultural economists can claim to have a complete theory of agricultural change at their 
disposal. I list a few examples:8 
1. Which are the main drivers of farmers’ behaviour? Do they display systematic patterns of 
behaviour that differ from other decision makers? 
2. Why do apparently inefficient farm structures persist for a long time? Why is the reaction 
of farmers to income pressure so sluggish? 
3. Why are farmers increasingly willing to integrate into vertical food chains? 
4. How do changes in the external environment, for example trade negotiations or the rising 
demand for biofuel or the public goods agriculture produces, affect the structure and 
hence the economic and social situation of farming? 
5. How quickly do such changes in external conditions lead to changes in structures? 
6. To what extent is public policy able and legitimated to intervene in the agricultural sector, 
or under which conditions can we expect that desirable outcomes emerge spontaneously? 
7. How do various types of policies, notably decoupled transfer policies of the current 
Common Agricultural Policy, affect structural change? 
8. Why are farmers sometimes able to organise collective action (e.g., in terms of political 
representation), but sometimes not (e.g., with respect to forming producer or marketing 
cooperatives)? 
The previous review of natural science paradigms in economics suggests that theories and 
methods are available to study these questions: 
a) Agricultural economists have only recently taken notice of the insights of behavioural 
and experimental approaches to better explain structural change in agriculture. However, 
what were at best guesses about an alternative view to standard rational choice studies 
some twenty or thirty years ago can now rely on a systematically enriched view of human 
behaviour, notably in terms of rule-following, adaptive preferences, risk aversion, 
reciprocity, as well as other types of context-dependent behaviour (Bowles 2004, 93-
                                                          
8  In setting up this list I borrowed heavily from the proposal document of the Forschergruppe. 
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126). Elster (2007, 217-220) provides a list of eighteen common “anomalies” to 
canonical rational choice theory, which are comparatively discussed and set in relation to 
each other. The list includes concepts such as loss aversion, hyperbolic discounting, or 
wishful thinking, which may help to solve some of the “paradoxes” of structural change. 
b) Based on work by Ostrom (1990) and others, Elster analyses “mechanisms” of decision 
making in groups that may stimulate further research on issues of collective action in 
agriculture. For example, some related “molecular mechanisms” quoted by Elster (2007, 
43) are “there is a black sheep in every flock” and “it takes only one black sheep to spoil 
a flock”. According to this “social chemistry”, any larger group contains at least one 
contrary person, which makes collective decision making difficult and may explain the 
move to smaller governance forms. Building on three modes of collective decision 
making, arguing, voting, and bargaining, Elster (2007, 401-424) develops an insightful 
analysis of incentives for the misrepresentation of preferences. 
c) The analysis of alternative forms of governance beyond the standard market model can 
now build on an elaborated and formally tractable typology that distinguishes three 
approaches to the regulation of coordination problems: privatisation, hierarchical 
regulation, or regulation through local interaction (Bowles 2004, 140). This typology has 
the potential to shed new light on the governance of public goods in rural areas (see 
Petrick 2007 for further discussion). 
d) The trade-off between efficiency and equality that can be considered a “folk-wisdom” in 
economics is clearly violated in circumstances of imperfect capital markets (Bowles 
2004, 299-330). In other words, wealth redistribution may lead to more efficient 
production structures because it allows those with initially few assets a better access to 
technology, and to avoid costly incentive problems because residual claimancy rests with 
the owner. Lacking access to capital in turn may cement structures and inefficiencies. 
These insights may enrich the understanding of vertical integration and provide an 
explanation for the intergenerational inheritance of economic status in agriculture. After 
all, they may even provide arguments to resolve the apparent trade-off between 
continuing government payments and the move to more efficient farm structures in 
European agriculture. 
e) The evolutionary economics literature reports substantial advances in modelling 
institutional change. Institutional competition is but one of the relevant mechanisms, 
while the emergence within a society of a large number of individuals who violate 
existing norms or institutions and eventually displace them is another (Bowles 2004, 
369). Recently developed methodological devices such as stochastic evolutionary game 
theory and multi-level selection models allow to set into relation the various parts played 
by conflicts of interest, chance, and collective action, and the highly irregular change 
processes called “punctuated equilibria” (p. 468). The application of such models to the 
understanding of various paths of agricultural transition is but one of many that could be 
imagined. 
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f) As argued in the previous chapter, there are various reasons why institutional evolution 
may not lead to desirable outcomes. Recent modelling advances go far beyond the 
“induced institutional innovation” hypothesis of Hayami and Ruttan (1985), which 
basically endorses the “invisible hand” analogy noted above. The insights of these 
evolutionary models may provide new justifications for government beyond the simple 
“no policy is the best policy” prescriptions, and may reinforce the need for critical policy 
evaluation by agricultural economists – but now with less certainty that “the market” will 
do it right. 
This list is not complete, but may suggest a number of starting points for further research that 
has the potential to shift out the theoretical frontier of agricultural economics in general and 
our understanding of structural change in particular. While the Walrasian paradigm will 
continue to provide the benchmark for these research efforts, it seems clear that evolution and 
chemistry have something to offer that is worthwhile to be considered. 
7. Concluding remarks 
In the 1980s, Wilhelm Brandes conjectured that a future economic science will abandon the 
two concepts of utility maximising and equilibrium (Brandes 1989, 339). He added:  
“It remains to be seen whether or not a markedly modified edifice of economic 
theory with a different mathematical structure will evolve. Such modifications would 
probably take away some of the subject’s elegance and beauty, but could possibly 
increase its potential and usefulness to some extent”.  
My personal conclusion from this survey is that today we have a coexistence of approaches to 
economics that differ in their a-priories and that are partly incompatible with each other. 
Perhaps not all of them can be grouped under the headings of physics, biology, or chemistry. 
However, the process so far has not been a revolution that ousted neoclassic orthodoxy 
altogether. The research landscape has become more heterodox, perhaps less well-ordered in 
terms of formal methods, but definitely has not suffered in beauty. I would argue that, 
because of this heterogeneity, the potential for insightful economic analysis is likely to be 
higher than some twenty years ago. 
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